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ABSTRACT
This is a response to five critiques of my 2018 book The Realm of Criminal 
Law, by Michelle Dempsey, Kimberley Brownlee, Roberto Gargarella, 
Tatjana Hörnle, and Gustavo Beade. Topics covered include the idea of a 
“public wrong”; the usefulness of the analogy I draw between criminal law 
and codes of professional ethics; how criminal law can function in polities 
characterized by deep cultural and normative differences; what scope 
there is for thick principles of criminalization; and whether offenders have 
a “right to be prosecuted”.
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1. INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank the other contributors to this symposium for their 
critically constructive responses to my book (Duff 2018): I cannot do justice 
to all their comments here, but will tackle (what I take to be) their most 
significant criticisms. They certainly expose some of the ways in which I 
failed to make my claims and arguments clear enough (to myself as well as 
to others), and they bring out some of the ways in which the book’s central 
themes need to be further developed; but I hope to show that they do not 
threaten the central ideas that I tried to explain and defend. In what follows 
I first give a brief account of the book’s aims and main themes (s. 2), and 
then respond to each of the commentators: to Michelle Dempsey, who 
DOI: 10.31009/LEAP.2019.V7.014
* I am very grateful to José Luis Martí, Roberto Gargarella, and Gustavo Beade for 
arranging and editing this symposium, and for organizing the workshop at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra at which drafts of the papers were discussed; and to the participants in that 
most enjoyable workshop.
234 R. A. Duff 
LEAP 7 (2019)
offers an alternative account of the central idea of public wrongs (s. 3); to 
Kimberley Brownlee, who criticizes the use that I make of an analogy 
between criminal law and codes of professional ethics (s. 4); to Roberto 
Gargarella, who argues that my account of public wrongs cannot be 
sustained in the context of radically plural societies (s. 5); to Tatjana 
Hörnle, who argues that we should replace my single, thin, principle of 
criminalization by a more pluralist account grounded in three distinct 
principles (s. 6); and to Gustavo Beade, who develops the suggestion that 
public wrongdoers have a “right to be prosecuted” (s. 7). 
2. THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW
The book emerged from a four-year research project on Criminalization, 
on which I worked with four colleagues: Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, 
Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros. The purpose of the project was, as we 
rashly described it, “to develop a normative theory of criminalization: an 
account of the principles and values that should guide decisions about 
what to criminalize”,1 and that was also my goal when I started work on the 
book. In one way, the book achieved that aim, since it offers a “public 
wrongs” theory of criminalization, whose central principle is:
A. We have reason to criminalize a type of conduct if, and only if, it 
constitutes a public wrong.
B. A type of conduct constitutes a public wrong if, and only if, it 
violates the polity’s civil order.2
In two ways, however, this will disappoint those looking for a developed, 
substantive theory of criminalization. First, the principle is extremely 
thin, since it leaves most of the substantive work, in determining just what 
kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, still to be done. For 
until we have given content to the ideas of “civil order” and “public wrongs”, 
which is itself a major normative undertaking, we cannot begin to work out 
this theory’s implications; and even when we have given those ideas 
substantive content, we will have worked out only what we have reason to 
criminalize, not what we should criminalize, all things considered. Second, 
most of the book is taken up, not with exploring the implications of this 
1 See Duff et al (2014: 1), which describes the project, and the other publications that 
it produced—and explains why it did not produce such a theory. I should record here my 
enormous debt to my colleagues on the project, as well as to the UK Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, which funded the project.
2 This principle is formulated in Duff (2018: 232, 275, 277), and explained in chs 6-7 
of the book.
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principle, but with more preliminary discussions of the way in which, the 
grounds from which, we can arrive at this master principle of 
criminalization. I can best explain the aims of the book by responding to 
these two grounds for disappointment.
If we are to decide what kinds of conduct we have reason to criminalize, 
we must ask what counts as a reason to criminalize; to decide that, we 
must ask what the purpose of criminalization could be, which is to ask 
what the purpose of criminal law could be. To answer that question, we 
must examine the role that criminal law can play within the institutional 
framework of a political community: for criminal law is, and must therefore 
be theorized as, part of the political structure of a polity.3  If we are to tackle 
that task, however, we must first have some idea of what criminal law is—
what distinguishes it, as a particular kind of institutional practice, from 
other institutions? Accordingly, the book begins with an account of 
criminal law as a practice that defines a set of wrongs whose perpetrators 
(actual or alleged) are to be called to formal public account through a 
criminal process, and to be formally censured, and liable to punishment, if 
proved guilty. This is not intended to be a neutral analysis of “the concept 
of criminal law”: rather, it offers a rational reconstruction of criminal law 
as an institution with a distinctive character, of which we can usefully ask 
what role (if any) it should play in a political community. Theorists of 
criminal law often focus on criminal punishment as its central 
characteristic, or as the end point towards which the substantive criminal 
law and the criminal process are directed: by contrast, I suggest that whilst 
criminal punishment is indeed a salient, and normatively problematic, 
feature of our systems of criminal law, a plausible justificatory rational 
reconstruction of criminal law need not, and should not, make punishment 
thus central; we can identify purposes and values in the criminal law that 
do not depend on punishment.
The claim that criminal law is essentially concerned with wrongs 
obviously implicates some version of legal moralism. Chapter 2 therefore 
discusses different species of legal moralism. It provides a defense of 
“negative legal moralism”—the claim that we may not criminalize conduct 
that is not morally wrongful prior to its criminalization; it distinguishes 
the version of “positive legal moralism” that I defend, according to which 
only “public” wrongs can give us reason to criminalize, from more familiar, 
more ambitious, versions, according to which we have reason to criminalize 
3 My focus in the book is almost entirely on the domestic criminal law of nation 
states (though I say a little about international criminal law in ch. 3.1-2): whatever the future 
of the nation state might be, this is the context in which criminal law is most fully developed.
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every type of morally wrongful conduct;4 and it provides an initial 
explanation of the idea of a “public” wrong by discussing the codes of 
ethics that professional bodies draw up—codes that identify the kinds of 
wrong that count as “public” for the profession in the sense that they fall 
within the profession’s distinctive practice. There is, I argue, a useful 
analogy between the criminal law, as the code of a political community, 
and a code of professional ethics: from which it follows that an account of 
public wrongs in relation to criminal law must depend on an account of the 
public realm of the polity. Those drawing up a code of medical ethics must 
begin with a conception of what medicine is as a distinctive practice—
what kinds of activity medicine involves, what aims and values should 
guide those activities: only then can they work out what kinds of conduct 
fall within its scope, and then what kinds of conduct must count as wrongs 
that concern the medical profession—as wrongs that count in that context 
as “public” wrongs. So too, if we are to draft a criminal code, and decide 
what kinds of conduct it ought to cover, we must begin with an account of 
the distinctive kind of practice whose code this is to be, of the aims and 
values by which that practice is (supposed to be) structured, and of the 
kinds of conduct that fall within its scope. That practice is the practice of 
civic life—the practice of living together as members of a political 
community: the “public” realm, the realm within which criminal law 
operates and within which we can identify the kinds of public wrong with 
which criminal law is concerned, is the realm of civic life. If we are to work 
towards a theory of criminalization, we must therefore begin with an 
account of the distinctive practice of civic life: only then can we work out 
what kinds of conduct could count, from the perspective of the polity and 
its criminal law, as “public” wrongs.
Chapter 3 embarks on this task by looking first at the identity of those 
who participate in the practice of civic life—those whose law the criminal 
law is supposed to be. It argues that citizens, as members of the polity 
whose law it is, are the criminal law’s primary addressees: it is to them that 
the law paradigmatically speaks, in terms of values that are meant to be 
their values; it is to their fellow citizens that they must answer for the public 
wrongs they commit; and in democratic polities it is they who “own” the 
criminal law—it is their law. Questions must then arise: about the 
relationship between the domestic criminal laws of nation states, as the 
laws of their citizens, and international and transnational criminal law 
(questions discussed only briefly in this book); and about the status of 
those who are not citizens of the polity but are still supposedly bound by its 
4 Michael Moore is the best known contemporary proponent of this more ambitious 
kind of legal moralism: see e.g. Moore 1997: chs 1, 16, 18.
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law, or of those who dissent from the polity’s values as reflected in its 
criminal law (questions that I discuss in more detail, to show how an 
account that, like mine, makes citizenship central can still do justice to 
non-citizens, who are to be treated as guests, and to dissenters).
Chapters 4-5 then provide an account of the kind of practice in which 
citizens are engaged: the “public realm” that constitutes their life together 
as citizens, in which criminal law operates as a type of public law.5 The 
concept of “civil order” is central to an understanding of this public realm 
(see Farmer 2016): a polity’s civil order consists in the normative ordering 
of its civic life —of its existence as a polity. That normative ordering is 
structured by the set of goals and values through which the polity 
constitutes itself as a political community: it can be partly defined in a 
written constitution, as a formal statement of the fundamental goals 
towards which the polity’s collective activities are oriented, and the values 
by which those activities are to be governed; but it is also implicit in the 
polity’s institutions of government and its citizens’ shared understandings 
of their civic life. Such a conception of civil order, as the ordering of the 
polity’s public realm, depends on a normative distinction between “public” 
and “private” realms: a polity’s civil order constitutes its public realm, in 
relation to which other aspects of its citizens’ lives are “private”; we must 
therefore attend to different distinctions between “public” and “private” 
that can be drawn. We must also attend to the preconditions of civil order: 
what kinds of agreement, what kinds of shared understanding, among the 
citizens are necessary if civil order is to be possible, and what can those 
who share such understandings say to those who do not? But given a viable 
conception of a polity’s civil order, and thus of its public realm, we can 
make better sense of the idea of a public wrong, as a kind of wrong that falls 
within that public realm, and that violates that civil order: such wrongs are 
in principle the business of the polity’s criminal law, as wrongs to which a 
formal, public response is appropriate (or even necessary).
Chapter 5 puts more substantial flesh on the relatively formal account 
of civil order provided in Chapter 4, by sketching the central aspects of the 
civil order of a particular kind of polity—a liberal republic of free and equal 
citizens: it draws on the republican tradition of political thought (and on a 
liberal kind of communitarianism, or communitarian kind of liberalism) 
to portray the kind of polity that we can plausibly aspire to create. We can 
then see the role that criminal law could play in such a polity as helping to 
sustain, but also as partly constituting, its civil order. For once we 
5 The slogan that criminal law is public law has become prominent recently, as part 
of the reaction against what its proponents see as unduly moralised conceptions of criminal 
law: see e.g. Thorburn 2010, Chiao 2019.
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understand the idea of a public wrong, as a wrong that violates an aspect of 
civil order, we can see criminal law as an appropriate way of marking, and 
responding to, such wrongs. Its central role is to declare some of the central 
norms of that civil order, as norms that define what kinds of conduct 
citizens are entitled to expect from each other (and from the polity); and 
then to provide the process through which those who are accused of 
violating these norms can be called to formal, public account by their 
fellow citizens: in doing so, it gives institutional form to the polity’s 
commitment to its defining values, and to its appropriately respectful 
concern for all its citizens—including both victims and offenders. (To say 
that the criminal law’s central role is to declare such norms and to provide 
for those who violate them to be called to public account is to deny that 
punishment is the primary purpose of criminal law: but given the 
oppressive salience of punishment in our existing systems of law, I also say 
something about the role of punishment in a liberal republic’s criminal 
law.)
Given this account of the role of criminal law in the civic life of a 
democratic republic, I turn, in Chapter 6, to criminalization: in particular, 
to the question of whether a normative theory of criminalization should 
offer a “master principle” by which our deliberations about criminalization 
could be guided. Different kinds of master principle are distinguished; 
some familiar master principles (notably the harm principles) are critically 
discussed. One central conclusion is that any plausible master principle 
will be very thin: it will provide, that is, not substantive criteria for 
criminalization, but formal criteria that leave most of the substantive 
normative work in deciding what kinds of conduct are to be criminalized 
still to be done. This is true of the master principle that emerges in the 
book: we have good reason to criminalize a type of conduct if and only it 
constitutes a public wrong;6 and it constitutes a public wrong if and only if 
it violates the polity’s civil order. This principle is very thin, in that it leaves 
the normative questions of how the polity’s civil order is to be constituted, 
and of what kinds of conduct should be taken to constitute violations of 
that order, still to be decided (through the process of public deliberation by 
which a democratic republic forms its criminal law). But we should not 
expect to be able to identify a master principle that is both thick and 
plausible; and the thin principle that I propose is still fruitful in identifying 
the kinds of consideration that are relevant to debates about criminalization, 
and thus in showing how deliberations about criminalization ought to be 
structured—what kinds of claim and argument must be made and 
6 The most a master principle can plausibly offer is an account of what gives us good 
reason to criminalize, not of what we should criminalize all things considered.
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defended if we are to be justified in criminalizing a type of conduct.
Chapter 7 seeks to make good on that claim for a “public wrongs” master 
principle, but only after an essential qualification. Criminalization is just 
one among a range of possible responses to public wrongs, distinguished 
from other responses by its concentration on the wrongfulness of the 
criminalized conduct and on calling perpetrators to public, censorial 
account. So the question whether we have good reason to criminalize a 
type of conduct is the question whether we have good reason to criminalize 
it rather than to respond in some other way; and a master principle of 
criminalization must help us to make that kind of “rather than” decision. 
To illustrate the work that the “public wrongs” principle can do, I briefly 
discuss examples of three kinds of criminal offence. First, I discuss “mala 
in se”, consisting in conduct that is held to be wrongful prior to its legal 
regulation. These are in one way the most straightforward kinds of crime 
to understand, but are in two respects somewhat complicated: for the 
criminalization process is a process not simply of trying to capture some 
pre-existing moral wrong, but of constructing a civic conception of the 
wrong as a public wrong; and, partly for this reason, the distinction 
between “mala in se” and “mala prohibita” (the latter being understood to 
consist in conduct that might be wrongful only because it is legally 
prohibited), whilst still important, is less clear cut than many think it is (or 
should be). Second, I discuss different species of “malum prohibitum”, 
involving different ways in which violations of pre-criminal legal 
regulations can constitute criminalizable wrongs: the distinction between 
regulation and criminalization is important here, as are the different ways 
in which regulatory violations can be wrongful (even when the conduct 
does not cause the kind of mischief at which the law is aimed). Third, I 
discuss examples of “pre-emptive” offences, which criminalize conduct 
that does not itself involve the mischief at which the law is ultimately 
aimed, but is in some way preparatory to, or increases the risk of, that 
mischief: one way in which our criminal laws have been expanding, 
especially in relation to terrorism, has been in the creation of wider kinds 
of pre-emptive offence; it is important to see how far such offences can be 
justified.
These discussions of different kinds of criminal offence are intended to 
be illustrative, rather than exhaustive: they illustrate the kinds of argument 
and deliberation that will be needed if we take a “public wrongs” principle, 
of the kind I have argued for, as our guide to criminalization. Those 
arguments and deliberations will have different contents in different 
polities, reflecting as they will different conceptions of a polity’s civil order, 
and I have not tried to argue in this book for one particular such conception: 
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which is not to say, as we will see, that I advocate a radical relativism 
according to which a polity’s conception of its own civil order, and the 
criminal laws that it creates to sustain that order, are beyond criticism or 
argument; but such criticisms require an engagement with substantive 
political theory that goes beyond the scope of this book. I have indicated 
the kind of (republican, liberally communitarian) political theory that I 
favor, and I have sketched some of its implications for civil order and for the 
criminal law; but I have not tried to justify, or indeed to explicate in detail, 
that theory, or to defend it against others—that would be a task for another 
book (and this book was already long enough, if not too long).
I turn now to engage with my commentators and to respond, if not to all 
their suggestions and criticisms, at least to the most significant of them.
3. PUBLIC WRONGS AND PUBLIC REALMS
I begin with Michelle Dempsey’s discussion of how we should understand 
the idea of the (or a) public realm, which is central to my account of crimes 
as public wrongs (Dempsey 2020). There is much about which Dempsey 
and I agree: in particular, that criminal law should be understood as a 
communicative practice in which wrongdoers are held to account, and 
which serves not merely to sustain, but also partly to constitute the civil 
order, the character, of the political community (Dempsey 2020: 158-9; 
Duff 2018: ch. 5.4-6). Our main disagreement is about how to understand 
the idea of a “public” wrong in this context.
On Dempsey’s account, what makes wrongs more, or less, public is the 
way in which the perpetrator is called to account: a wrong is more “public” 
to the extent that the wrongdoer is or should be called to account more 
publicly; and a calling to account is more public insofar as it done, 
observably, by representatives of a larger group. Thus at one end of the 
“private”-“public” spectrum we have “comprehensively private” callings to 
account done by the direct victim on her own behalf, in private; and at the 
other end we find “comprehensively public” callings to account in public 
by representatives of “the entire political community” (Dempsey 2020: 
165). This is certainly a possible account of the idea of a “public wrong”, 
and Dempsey offers a useful analysis of what it involves; but it is not the 
(admittedly somewhat stipulative) conception of the “public” with which I 
work.
For Dempsey publicness is a univocal, scalar matter of how “public” a 
calling to account is; for me, it is a practice-relative matter that does not 
permit such a scalar analysis. A wrong, on my account, is a “public” wrong 
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if it is one that properly concerns “the public”; and “the public” consists in 
the participants in the relevant practice or community. Thus in the context 
of a political community, a wrong counts as “public” if, and only if, it 
properly concerns the members of that community, in virtue of its bearing 
on the practice of living together as a political community in which they 
are engaged; in the context of a golf club, by contrast, a wrong is “public” if 
and only if it properly concerns the members of the club, in virtue of the 
practice—playing golf—in  which they are engaged together; in the context 
of an academic institution, a wrong is “public” if and only if it properly 
concerns the participants in that institution, as bearing on the scholarly, 
educational practice in which they are engaged. Two implications follow 
from this; both concern matters on which Dempsey and I disagree.
First, a wrong might be public in the context of one practice, but not in 
the context of other practices in which the wrongdoer also participates. If I 
cheat in a golf match, that is a public matter as far as my fellow golfers 
(fellow members of the club, or golfers anywhere, if we see golf as a practice 
in which all golfers participate) are concerned. It is their business: they 
have the standing to call me to account for it; I cannot rebut their challenge 
by insisting that it is a private matter. However, it is not a public matter in 
the context of the university philosophy department to which I belong: my 
academic colleagues, qua colleagues, lack the standing to call me to 
account for it, since it is no part of, has no bearing on, the practice in which 
we are mutually engaged; if they challenge me, I can properly tell them 
that it is none of their business—that I do not answer to them for my 
conduct on the golf course.7 Similarly, my lackadaisical discharge of my 
academic duties, my failure to mark my students’ essays on time, are public 
matters in the context of my department and my university, but private 
matters in the context of my golf club: I do not answer for them to my fellow 
golfers.
Second, to determine whether a wrong should count as a public wrong 
in the context of a particular practice, we need an idea of what that practice 
is: what are its distinctive goals and activities; what values structure those 
activities? Indeed, we can often identify a wrong as a wrong, or as a 
particular kind of wrong, only by attending to the practice within which it 
is a wrong: we understand what counts as cheating at golf, and why it 
matters, by grasping the character of golf as a distinctive kind of practice. 
That is part of what I meant by arguing that we must start with “the 
7 More precisely, I do not answer to them qua colleagues: my cheating is not 
something that can properly be brought up at a departmental meeting, or made the subject 
of a disciplinary charge. But if a colleague is also a friend, or a member of the same golf club, 
she can in that context challenge me about my cheating.
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public”—with an account of the “public realm”, the distinctive aims and 
activities, of the practice within which we are operating: for only then can 
we identify the wrongs that should count as public within that practice. 
But “Start with the public” becomes a more important slogan when we 
imagine ourselves not as agents acting within the framework of an existing, 
fully formed practice, but as lawmakers—for instance as people charged 
with the task of formulating the golf club’s rules of conduct, or a university’s 
code of ethics. If that is our task, it would be misguided to start with a list 
of all the wrongs that can be committed, and then ask which of them 
should figure in the code. We must begin with a conception of the practice’s 
“public realm”—of what kinds of conduct fall within the practice; only 
then can we identify kinds of misconduct that should concern participants 
in the practice. Thus the slogan “Start with the public” can also be 
expressed by saying that wrongdoing, misconduct, presupposes conduct, 
which presupposes a public realm. A code of ethics, whether for a golf club 
or a university, or any other social practice, deals with misconduct—not 
misconduct in general, but misconduct in activities that belong to the 
practice (“professional misconduct” is misconduct in one’s professional 
activities): to identify the kinds of misconduct with which our code should 
deal we must therefore first identify the kinds of conduct or activity that 
belong to that practice. That is why, if we imagine ourselves as tasked not 
to draw up a code of ethics for an existing practice, but to construct a 
constitution for a new or newly organized practice, we will not, and cannot, 
begin with a code of ethics: we must begin by formulating a conception of 
the practice, of its aims and guiding values, and of the kinds of activity that 
fall within it; only then can we turn to determining what should count as 
censurable misconduct in that context. We begin, that is, with a conception 
of the practice’s res publica—its public realm; we are then in a position to 
identify kinds of wrongdoing that fall within that realm and therefore 
count as “public” in that context.
As with golf clubs and universities, and other practices and professions, 
so too (I argue) with political communities and their criminal laws (hence 
the discussion of codes of ethics in ch. 2). The members of a political 
community are engaged together in a distinctive practice, of living together 
as citizens; their criminal law will deal with kinds of wrongdoing that 
count as “public” in the context of that practice in virtue of their impact on 
it—on the polity’s “civil order”; to identify those kinds of wrong, we must 
therefore first have some conception of that civil order—of the polity’s 
constitution as a distinctive practice. As analytical theorists or as 
sociological inquirers, we can understand a polity’s criminal law by seeing 
it in relation to that polity’s conception of its civil order, and recognize that 
different polities are structured by different conceptions of civil order 
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(they have different constitutions; hence the discussion of constitutions in 
ch. 4). As normative theorists, or as active participants in the life of our 
own polity, we will argue about how this or any polity should conceive its 
civil order; only on that basis will we be able to argue sensibly about the 
proper scope of its criminal law—about what it should count as public 
wrongs, and about how it should respond to them (hence the discussion of 
liberal republicanism in ch. 5).
We can now see how, although Dempsey and I agree on the importance 
of “Alternative Sites of Public Accountability (ASPAs)” (Dempsey 2020: 
167), we disagree about how they should be understood. On her view, they 
are different ways of achieving the same end: that wrongdoers are called to 
account. For any given (kind of) wrong, we can ask which ASPA is most 
suitable for calling the wrongdoer to account, and we might seek a sensible 
division of labour between different sites. Thus a golf cheat might be most 
suitably called to account not by the criminal law, or by his employer, but 
by fellow members of his golf club (or perhaps by the sport’s central 
governing body): for the club is most likely to be best placed to call him to 
account; and in doing so it can also help to constitute itself as a valuable 
institution, which seeks to realise the values of fair play and honesty in its 
practices. It might be so obvious that given the nature of the wrong and the 
available ASPAs, the golfer should be called to account by his club, that 
legislators formulating the polity’s criminal law would not even consider 
cheating at golf (or at games generally) as a candidate for criminalization 
(unless it involved some financial gain). It remains true, however, on 
Dempsey’s account, that there is reason in principle to criminalize cheating 
at golf, even though there are obviously better reasons not to do so: for this 
would help to realise the good of wrongdoers being called to account for 
their wrongs. This might not be a reason to which legislators should attend 
in their deliberations: but it figures in “a full philosophical account of the 
reasons that … bear on the justifiability” of their decisions about the scope 
of the criminal law (Dempsey 2020: 171); and it must then surely figure in 
the thinking of self-reflective legislators who wonder what kinds of reason 
should figure in their first-order deliberations. 
A crucial point, which highlights the difference between Dempsey and 
me, is that on her account, “in deciding whether any given calling to 
account is justified” (whether it would, for instance, be right for a legislature 
to have golf cheats called to account by the criminal law), “we should 
consider whether and how the wrongdoer will otherwise be called to 
account”; and one reason in favour of criminalization would be that this 
“is the only way the wrongdoer will be held to account” (Dempsey 2020: 162). 
In designing our institutions, we must attend to all those values that might 
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be realised through the institution’s activities; and one value is that 
wrongdoers are called to account for their wrongdoing. On Dempsey’s 
view, “if a person can realise a value through her action, then normally she 
will have a reason to act so as to realise that value”:8 since criminalizing 
cheating at games could help realise the value of wrongdoers being held to 
account, a legislature has reason to do so—although no doubt it has much 
better reasons not to do so, and not even to think of doing so.
I have two main responses to this line of thought. First, the relevant 
value here is not that of wrongdoers being held to account, but that of 
wrongdoers being held to account by those to whom they are answerable; 
and they are answerable to, and only to, fellow members of the normative 
practice in which the wrong is done. If a passing stranger seeks to call a golf 
cheat to account for her cheating, he might succeed in calling her to a kind 
of account: but he does not achieve the proper end that would be achieved 
if she was held to account by her fellow members, to whom she is properly 
answerable for her golfing (mis)conduct9  We might miss this point if we 
think only of more serious kinds of moral wrong, since we might think that 
those who commit such wrongs are answerable to “the moral community”, 
which includes all moral agents; but we live in other communities than the 
moral community, with different and more limited scopes. 
Second, whether we are acting within some existing practice, or trying 
to construct one, it is wrong to suggest that we have reason (even in 
principle) to try so to design our practice as to realise each of all the many 
possible values—as if those founding a golf club have reason, in principle, 
to take the promotion of aesthetic appreciation as an aim, and to formulate 
the club’s constitution accordingly (as the normal correspondence thesis 
implies). It matters that what they are doing has some value, and they 
might be accused of normative myopia if they attach undue importance to 
the value of what they are doing: but even if we look for “a full philosophical 
account of the reasons that actually do bear on the justifiability” of the 
practice that they construct, that account would not plausibly make reference 
to all the goods that they could help to realise in constructing the practice.
To which Dempsey might with justice reply that, even if there is some 
8 Dempsey 2009: 83 (on “the normal correspondence thesis”); see also Gardner 
2007: 62-3, on the “agent-neutralist” view of reasons. This is one part of an ongoing argument 
about the nature of practical reason between me and theorists such as Dempsey and 
Gardner: see Dempsey 2011, Gardner 2011, Duff 2013.
9 Analogously, if a vigilante mob lock up an unconvicted offender for the length of 
time for which he would have been imprisoned if convicted, they might bring about roughly 
the same material impact that his formal punishment would have brought about; but they 
do not achieve the end that would justify that punishment—that he be held to punitive 
account by those to whom he is answerable, his fellow citizens.
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analogy between professions (or golf clubs) and polities, it breaks down 
just when I need it to do serious work. It might be ridiculous for those 
creating a golf club, or a profession’s constitution, to attend to all the goods 
that they could in principle realize: but it is surely far from ridiculous, 
indeed it would surely be entirely proper, for the founders of a polity to 
think in such terms; and, in particular, if they take seriously the importance 
of wrongdoers being called to account, they should think about how they 
can help to realise that good. The first point noted above still remains: that 
if what matters is that wrongdoers be called to account to and by those to 
whom they are answerable, it is not clear that a polity could help to realise 
that end by criminalizing every kind of wrong; for that would presume that 
wrongdoers of all kinds are answerable, at least in principle, to their fellow 
citizens—but that is a central point at issue between me and Dempsey. 
However, why should a polity not take the collective view that, first, every 
kind of moral wrongdoing in principle falls within its purview, so that 
those who commit any kind of wrong are in principle answerable to the 
polity; but, second, that there are many wrongs with which it should not 
deal directly, since they are better delegated to one of the more specific 
practices that are found within the polity? Thus, for instance, wrongs 
committed in the course of medical practice are in principle, like all 
wrongs, criminalizable as the polity’s business; but many of them can be 
better dealt with through the medical profession’s own disciplinary 
procedures.10 Now a polity could coherently take this view of the matter, 
just as it could take Moore’s view of the proper aim of criminal law, as being 
to inflict retribution on culpable wrongdoers;11 and Dempsey is ready to 
“plead guilty” to offering “a modified version of “Moorean legal moralism” 
(2020: 172). I think that is indeed what she offers—although the 
modification is crucial, since it replaces the infliction of retributive 
suffering by the more plausible goal of calling wrongdoers to account; and 
I do not offer anything resembling a refutation of either Moorean or 
Dempseyan legal moralism. But what I do argue against Moore, and would 
now argue against Dempsey, is that to advocate such legal moralism is to 
take a particular view of the proper concerns of a polity: that it has an in 
principle proper interest in every aspect of its citizens’ lives, since it has 
such an in principle interest in all the wrongs that they might commit. 
Both Moore and Dempsey would then set tight limits on the kinds of wrong 
in which a liberal polity should actually take an interest; but my claim is 
that a truly liberal polity would not need to set such limits, because its 
10 And I agree that this kind of delegation is sometimes possib profession’s own 
disciplinary procedures le, and desirable: see Duff 2018: 89-91.
11 For Moore’s view see e.g. Moore 1997: ch. 1; for detailed critical discussion see Duff 
2018: ch. 2.
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initial conception of itself —of the practice of living together as members 
of the polity, of the aspects of its members’ lives and activities that fall 
within that practice—would not include every kind of wrong. To include 
every kind of wrong, it would need to include every kind of conduct (for 
misconduct presupposes conduct): but a central defining feature of liberal 
as against totalitarian polities is that they precisely reject such a view.
At times I wonder whether the difference between Dempsey and me is 
substantial: for we agree that a wide range of wrongs (those that a liberal 
polity would not criminalize) are not in the end the polity’s business, and 
seem to differ only about the stage of deliberation at which “it’s not the 
polity’s business” comes into the picture. However, first, that difference 
matters, if our aim is to understand the proper structure of arguments 
about criminalization. Second, her account of the idea of the “public” 
seems to me not to do justice to what we might call the practice-relativity 
of the public, or to allow a sufficiently basic role to the thought that some 
wrongs are, from the polity’s point of view, categorically “private”.
4. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW
My account of public wrongs and of the criminal law’s role in a political 
community depends in part on an analogy between criminal law and 
professional codes of ethics (Duff 2018: ch. 2.7-9). This analogy is the focus 
of Kimberley Brownlee’s paper (2020). Brownlee points out various 
“problematic features” of existing professional codes—various pathologies 
to which they are vulnerable. One is that members of a profession are likely 
to accept without question the moral worth of the practice in which they 
are engaged, and base their code of ethics on that assumption, whereas a 
more critical scrutiny might show the practice to be, if not “rotten to the 
core”, morally suspect in some of the aims it pursues or the means by which 
it pursues them: but if the practice is morally suspect, its code of ethics will 
fail to identify the kinds of conduct in which its members really ought, or 
ought not, to engage.12  Another problem is that codes of ethics can provide 
a spurious respectability, an “appearance of ethical credibility” to a 
profession, so protecting it from critical scrutiny. They can also require 
members to behave in ways that are, seen from a larger perspective, 
unethical, and encourage (if not coerce) an uncritical obedience to what 
12 Brownlee comments on those who “engage in profit-hungry high finance” (2020: 
177): I once heard a talk on professional ethics in the financial sector, during which the 
lecturer told us that one of the “dilemmas” that people working in the sector faced was “How 
far should you exploit the customer’s ignorance?”; if that figures in your conception of your 
professional activity as a “dilemma”, something is badly wrong.
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the code requires. Brownlee also points out that the distinction (a crucial 
one on my account) between what falls within the realm of “professional 
conduct” and thus legitimately concerns other participants in the practice, 
and what falls outside that realm and thus counts as “private” as far as the 
profession is concerned, is not a clear-cut or uncontroversial one. Similar 
problems, she argues, arise if we see criminal law as analogous to a code of 
professional ethics—indeed, they arise in sharper form. Most obviously, 
we must ask how members of a polity are to arrive at an acceptable 
conception of their res publica—of the goals and values that are to structure 
their collective life; we must recognise the danger that those goals and 
values will not be ones that are worth pursuing; and we must ask who gets 
to determine those goals and values, and the laws that are to reflect and 
protect them.13
I agree with almost everything Brownlee says about the kinds of 
problem that can infect, and undermine the moral authority of, both 
professional codes of ethics and the criminal law, and I should have made 
clear that in my discussion of such codes I was not assuming that the kinds 
of code we actually have are unproblematic: that those whom they claim to 
bind ought simply to accept them; that the processes by which they are 
drawn up are unproblematically legitimate; that they reflect conceptions 
of the worth of the relevant profession that are not to be questioned. I do 
assume that professions can be of significant value—that such professions 
as medicine, law, education can (if properly constituted and governed) 
contribute to human well-being; and that there is good reason for any 
profession’s constitution to include a code of ethics, dealing with the kinds 
of conduct in which its members should (not) engage in the course of their 
professional activities, and procedures through which they can be called 
to account for professional misconduct. I also assume that, however much 
room there might be for disagreement around the borders, it will be 
possible, and ethically necessary, to draw a distinction between the 
“public” and the “private” in the context both of professions and of the 
criminal law. Now Brownlee seems to accept that codes of ethics, and thus 
presumably the professions whose codes they are, can be valuable, which 
is also to accept that they need not “instrumentalize moral reasoning”—that 
they need not pervert moral thought by making it an instrument of the 
13 Brownlee finds my talk of the “Founding Parents” who are, I imagine, to draw up a 
polity’s constitution and its criminal law “jarring”, because “it occludes the fact that the 
people drafting the laws in almost all polities have not been Parents, but Fathers and, indeed, 
white Fathers” (Brownlee 2020: 188; see Duff 2018: 92-101). My talk of “Parents”, rather than 
of the “Founding Fathers” who loom so large in the rhetoric of the US Constitution, was 
precisely intended to jar: to remind readers that if we are engaged in normative theory, 
rather than in positivist description, we must not take for granted the identity of the 
legislators.
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profession’s morally disreputable ends, or serve to protect its members 
from moral scrutiny (see Brownlee 2020: 182). So is her worry simply that I 
pay inadequate attention to the ways in which both professions and 
polities, and their codes, can go wrong: that my discussions display an 
unwarranted complacency about the kinds of code, and the kinds of 
criminal law, that we actually have? I think there is more to it than that—
and that “more” highlights an important aspect of my account.
One problem, in Brownlee’s eyes, seems to be that my account, both of 
professional codes and of criminal law (or of a polity’s civil order, from 
which its criminal law will flow), is set in overly “formal” terms that do not 
allow us to distinguish the substantively acceptable from the unacceptable—
those that are created, by suitable procedures, to serve worthwhile ends by 
morally appropriate means, from those that are not: I must recognize (as 
an “extreme example”) that the SS had a code of ethics (Brownlee 2020: 
177); and the “formal” character of professional codes too often serves to 
conceal, rather than to illuminate, the substantive moral values by which 
the profession’s members ought to guide their conduct (2020: 179-80). 
There are two distinct worries about formalism here.
The first concerns the character of the codes and the role they play in 
professionals’ lives: if they are expressed as sets of formal rules, which the 
members are simply to obey without further (self-)critical thought, they 
can indeed have the kind of morally blinkering effects that Brownlee 
highlights; similarly, if citizens see their criminal law simply as a set of 
rules that they are to obey, this is likely to blind them (or to help them blind 
themselves) to the more nuanced moral considerations that should guide 
their actions. However, that is an objection not to professional codes of 
ethics as such, but to some of the ways in which they can be formulated 
and treated; and, in the case of criminal law, I argued that the criminal law 
of a decent polity will not be a set of prohibitions or rules that citizens are 
simply to obey. The citizens will maintain a critical attitude towards their 
criminal law, as a fallible attempt to express the polity’s shared values; 
they will be ready, as good citizens, to act if necessary in ways that it defines 
as criminal; and even when it can claim their allegiance rather than their 
critical opposition, they will apply it with a critically discretionary 
understanding—they will not simply follow it blindly. There are questions, 
in particular in the context of the kinds of regulation whose breach 
constitutes a malum prohibitum, about when we should subject our 
conduct to relatively strict, formal rules—for instance to regulations 
specifying the maximum speed at which we may drive, rather than to the 
injunction not to drive dangerously (see at nn 30-32 below): but neither 
codes nor criminal laws need be “formal” in ways that distort our practical 
reasoning.
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The second worry concerns the “formal” character of my account of 
both professional codes and the criminal law: that it makes room for, or 
allows in, codes that serve the ends of morally repugnant “professions” 
(like the SS), or that fail to capture the moral considerations that should 
guide the profession’s members; that it makes room for profoundly 
undemocratic systems of criminal law that function to protect the interests 
of the powerful rather than to serve the common good. This is certainly 
true—up to a point. My initial aim was to give a rather formal account of 
criminal law (as involving the definition of a set of public wrongs and the 
provision of a process through which those accused of such wrongs would 
be called to public account), and of the idea of civil order (and of a polity’s 
constitution) in which the criminal law is to be grounded; analogously, my 
aim was to provide a rather formal account of professional codes of ethics, 
which did not try to say anything substantive about the aims a profession 
should pursue, about which professions are worthwhile, or about the 
appropriate content of their codes of ethics. The account is not purely 
formal: not anything could count as a profession or professional code, or as 
a conception of civil order, or as a system of criminal law. But it counts as 
professions both the good and the bad, so long as they can be seen to be 
oriented towards some intelligible conception of a good that is worth 
pursuing; it counts as codes of ethics codes that can be seen to govern 
members’ conduct in the light of that good;14 it counts as polities with 
conceptions of their civil order utterly undemocratic societies that are 
oriented towards substantively unacceptable goals, or that take substantively 
unacceptable views of what counts as “public” or as “private”, and the 
content of whose criminal codes is therefore substantively unacceptable.15 
For a current example, if the Indonesian parliament enacts its proposed 
new criminal code, which criminalizes “living together outside marriage” 
and “extramarital sex”,16  that will be a genuine criminal law, which reflects 
a conception of Indonesia’s civil order as including matters concerning 
marriage and sexual relationships that, in western liberal societies, count 
as “private”; that code, and that conception of civil order, might not have 
been arrived at through a process of democratic deliberation, but that 
cannot disqualify them from counting as a conception of civil order and as 
a code that gives expression to it. Am I therefore committed to approving 
that criminal code, that conception of civil order, as acceptable—if not 
14 And even codes that are purported thus to govern members’ conduct, but are 
better understood as covers for the profession’s unethical aims; to count these as codes of 
ethics is also to make clear that they are to be assessed in the light of their purported aims.
15 “Substantively unacceptable” to whom, or by what criteria? See s. 5 below.
16 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/20indonesia-hundreds-of- 
thousands-oppose-plan-that-would-outlaw-extramarital-sex.
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universally or for “us”, at least for Indonesia? Of course not—just as in 
recognizing that someone who believes that homosexual conduct is 
morally wrong, or that it is morally permissible to factory farm animals, 
holds a genuine moral view I am not thereby committed to endorsing that 
view as acceptable.
In theorizing about criminal law (as about morality), even if our aims 
are normative, we should distinguish different stages or elements, only 
some of which are (directly) normative. We may begin with a (relatively) 
formal account of criminal law, as I do in ch. 1; we might add, as I do, a 
relatively formal account of the role of criminal law, as thus understood, in 
the structure of a political community (this will include a formal account 
of the idea of a political community). This might lead us to the formal 
principle of criminalization that I advocate: one that is formal in that it 
leaves open the question of what substantive content is to be given to the 
concepts of “civil order” and “public wrong”. The point of beginning with 
such a formal account is partly to clarify the nature of the practice we are 
theorizing; but also to bring into view the kinds of argument that are 
relevant to assessing, justifying or criticizing systems of criminal law. One 
who wants to justify a criminal code must, if my formal account is right, be 
able to argue that the conduct it defines as criminal is a public matter, and 
is wrongful, and must therefore also be able to articulate a conception of 
the polity’s civil order in which such conduct will count as public and 
wrongful: but there are limits of intelligibility on what can even count as a 
conception of civil order or of public wrongs; and in offering such 
arguments the advocate will bring her claims within the reach of normative 
political, legal and moral appraisal—she will have to subject those claims 
to those kinds of appraisal.
A second stage or element is roughly procedural: we discuss the kind of 
process through which a polity’s (self-)constitution, its conception of its 
civil order, and its criminal law are to be constructed. We cannot say, a priori, 
that those processes must be in any way democratic: monarchies and 
oligarchies are political communities, structured by some (non-
democratic) conception of civil order, and maintaining systems of criminal 
law. But, changing gear from the analytical to the normative, we can argue 
that a decent polity, one we could recognise or accept as a respect-worthy 
political community, must be democratic in its self-constituting procedures 
(we will then need to go on to discuss which kinds of procedure should 
count as “democratic”). Familiar questions now arise about who “we” are 
to make such arguments, and what purchase they should rationally have 
on non-democratic rulers: about, for instance, whether we can rationally 
demonstrate that a polity must be democratic if it is to have any justified 
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claim to legitimacy or authority—and about what follows, in terms of the 
claims or judgments that we can properly make, if we must accept that no 
such rational demonstration is available (questions, that is, about 
“relativism”). We need not pursue such questions here: we need only note 
the familiar point that impeccably democratic procedures can produce 
conceptions of civil order, and of what counts as a “public wrong”, that 
“we” (postponing again the question of who “we” are) find unacceptable. 
If we take a positivist, detached stance, we can describe the conception 
of civil order that a polity espouses, and the conceptions of public wrongs 
and the proper scope of its criminal law that flow from that conception: in 
P, we might say, the civil order encompasses sexual relationships, and a 
heterosexual view of the kinds of sexual relationship that are legitimate; in 
P, accordingly, and consistently with that conception, other kinds of sexual 
relationship are criminalized as public wrongs. This does not commit us to 
endorsing P’s criminal law: once we replace our positivist hats by more 
committedly normative hats, and engage (as citizens, as external critics or 
as normative theorists) in substantive argument about how we, or they, 
should conceive their civil order and their criminal law, we can argue that 
consensual sexual relationships should be seen as falling, as far as the 
polity is concerned, within the “private” rather than within the “public” 
realm, and/or that non-heterosexual relationships should be accepted and 
recognized as valuable; and so on. Once we make this move to substantive 
normative arguments about the content of civil order or of the criminal 
law, we are at the third stage or element of our theorizing—a stage in which 
I did not seriously engage in this book (although in ch. 5 I sketched, as an 
illustration, what I take to be a plausible substantive conception of a 
republican polity). This was not because I think this stage unimportant; it 
was because I wanted to make clear the crucial initial stages of a theory of 
criminal law.
In brief, then, Brownlee is right to highlight the kinds of deficiency or 
pathology that can affect (infect) professional codes of ethics, and the 
criminal law; she is right to point out the ways in which such codes can 
distort or subvert the kind of ethical thinking that should guide the conduct 
of members of professions (and of citizens): that is why members of 
professions need to take a suitably (self-)critical stance towards their 
professions’ self-justifications and their codes; that is why citizens need to 
maintain a (self-)critical stance towards their polities’ conceptions of their 
civil order and towards the criminal laws that help to sustain that order. 
But none of this is a threat to the (quite limited) analogy that I drew 
between the criminal law and professional codes of ethics; nor does it 
undermine the claim that criminal law can serve an important and 
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valuable role in the life of a political community, just as a code of ethics can 
play an important, valuable role in the life of a profession.
5. MULTICULTURALISM AND DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE
I have talked about a political community and its members; about how 
they can develop and articulate a conception of their civil order, and an 
account of the shared values that structure their civic enterprise of living 
together as fellow citizens. Such talk makes sense, it might be said, in 
societies with culturally homogenous populations: societies whose 
members can be said to share a form of life, and who can be expected to 
agree on the key values that inform that way of life. This is, however, not 
our present condition, as Roberto Gargarella forcefully reminds us: the 
societies about whose criminal laws contemporary criminal law theorists 
seek to theorize are characterized not by cultural homogeneity or 
agreement, but by deep diversity and difference. The pressing question 
then is whether and how we can normatively theorize criminal law in ways 
that do justice to the facts of “multiculturalism”: Gargarella argues that my 
account fails to do adequately democratic justice to multiculturalism 
(Gargarella 2020). Indeed, his critique is broader than that: although, on 
my account, the voice of the criminal law should be the voice of the political 
community, my account does not make that possible, whether or not the 
community is a multicultural one.
I do not think that Gargarella and I disagree, or need disagree, as much 
as he supposes we do. To show why that is so, I begin with four preliminary 
points, to clear up what might have been some misunderstandings.
First, Gargarella takes me to define “public wrongs as faults that ‘are 
clearly inconsistent with, manifest violations of, any remotely plausible 
conception of civil order’”, or “conducts that are ‘intrinsically … 
inconsistent with civil order’” (Gargarella 2020: 195-6, quoting Duff 2018: 
300). But I am not there discussing public wrongs in general: I am talking 
only about murder and rape as, I supposed, obvious examples of kinds of 
wrong that any polity ought to criminalize; I accept, as an implication of 
my account of the relationship of criminal law to civil order, that we will 
find differences both within and between polities about many public 
wrongs—about which kinds of conduct should be seen as public matters, 
or as wrongful. All I meant to claim was that it is hard, perhaps impossible, 
to imagine a polity whose members share a conception of their civil order 
according to which it is not a public wrong to kill any other person at will, 
or to force sexual penetration on others regardless of their will. That is not 
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to say that we cannot all too easily imagine a society in which members of 
some groups are treated as “fair game” for members of the dominant 
group: it is only to say that we cannot imagine a community (as distinct 
from a mere aggregate of individuals living within the same geographical 
territory) in which everyone is fair game for everyone else; and that a 
society in which members of one group were in that way fair game for 
members of another, dominant group would not be normatively plausible, 
or a society of citizens living together. Indeed, that claim is even stronger if 
we accept Gargarella’s account of how a society ought to go about 
determining its voice and its laws—through a 
“public, collective conversation, where each person participates as an 
equal together with all the others. Every voice has then to be listened, 
every viewpoint has to be considered, every interest has to be taken 
into account” (2020: 205).
Such a conversation would predictably lead to different substantive 
conclusions in different groups or communities, but there are constraints 
on those conclusions. For if the participants are to view and treat each 
other as equals, that requires a mutual respect between them, which is 
inconsistent with seeing some other participants as fair game who can be 
killed or sexually coerced at will.
Second, even in cases in which I take it to be uncontroversial that any 
polity must count some wrongs, such as murder and rape, as public, 
criminalizable wrongs, I do not suppose that their precise definitions as 
public wrongs will be unproblematic. Any non-pacifist polity will allow, for 
instance, that killing another is sometimes permissible: so a polity will 
need to decide just how to define murder as a public wrong; and here there 
will be ample scope for disagreement. So too with rape: apart from the 
question of whether there should be a distinct crime of “rape”, as opposed 
to various crimes of (sexual) assault,17 there is a familiar range of difficult 
questions about the precise scope and definition of the crime. That is why 
I note that the process of defining even obvious mala in se as crimes is a 
process of construction (Duff 2018: ch. 7.4): we cannot simply reproduce in 
our criminal law some already available pre-legal understanding of just 
what the wrong consists in.
Third, one of my claims is that the criminal law’s offence definitions 
must purport to be, or be justified as, definitions of kinds of conduct that 
are already wrongful independently of the criminal law. Some are 
(allegedly) pre-legal wrongs, wrongful independently of and prior to the 
17 Compare ss 271-3 of the Canadian Criminal Code.
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law: these are “mala in se”. Others are wrongful only in virtue of the law, for 
instance in virtue of a legal regulation that prohibits them, and are thus 
not pre-legally wrongful: but they must still be wrongful independently of 
the criminal law that criminalizes them; these are “mala prohibita”, which 
are pre-criminally, but not pre-legally, wrongful.18 So when I say that the 
criminal law does not create the wrongfulness of the mala in se that it 
criminalizes, but rather “declares that these pre-existing, pre-legal wrongs” 
are public wrongs (Duff 2018: 123; see Gargarella 2020: 200), all that  I mean 
by “pre-existing” is “pre-legal”—existing prior to the law. If we then ask 
whether such wrongs can be said to “pre-exist” not just the law, but the (or 
any) political community, we enmesh ourselves in questions about the 
metaphysics of value that neither Gargarella nor I need to tackle for our 
present purposes. We are neither of us relativists (Gargarella 2020: 195): 
thus while we can agree that in some sense communities “construct” the 
values by which they live, their constructions are not immune to criticism; 
dissident participants or interested observers can argue that they are 
wrong. We need not here tackle the further question of what kind of 
metaphysical foundation such criticism requires.
Fourth, my “oscillations between liberal and communitarian positions” 
are said to create “confusions” (Gargarella 2020: 192)—as if one cannot 
consistently be both a “communitarian” and a “liberal”, which is what I 
claim to be. Now on Gargarella’s understanding of liberalism, that is a 
fair point: for he takes the distinction between liberalism and 
communitarianism to be one “between the universal and the communal; 
the general and the particular; the critical view about the structures in 
which we live, and the attachment to the communities where we live”; 
between “shared, localized, communal values” and “more universal 
values” (2020: 198). Thus whilst “liberals” will insist on assessing the values 
espoused by particular communities in the light of (supposedly) universal 
values, “communitarians” cannot, it seems, take such a critical stance 
towards local values. But that is not the sense of “liberal” in which I claim 
to be a liberal, nor indeed the sense of “communitarian” in which I claim to 
be a communitarian —although given the variety of possible meanings for 
each of those terms, I should have made my usage clearer, which is what I 
18 I thus defend (Duff 2018: ch. 2.3-4) a “Strong Wrongness Constraint”. I should 
comment briefly here on the cautionary “(allegedly)” in “Some are (allegedly) pre-legal 
wrongs”. Gargarella picks up on a cognate remark that the criminal law “must speak, or 
claim to speak, in the voice of” a political community (2020: 203; see Duff 2018: 110), and 
rightly notes that speaking and claiming to speak are very different things. All I meant was 
that if the law is to make a claim on our allegiance it must claim to speak in our voice, and we 
can then discuss whether that claim is justified; only if that claim is justified does the law 
have a justified claim on our allegiance.
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will now try to do (see further Duff 2001: ch. 2).
Communitarianism is opposed not to liberalism (in all its forms), but to 
a particular type of “individualism”, according to which political 
deliberations must always begin (and end) in the first person singular: 
each person must ask: “How am I to live?”. For communitarians, the 
question must of course be answered, in the end, by each person: but the 
question to be asked is “How are we to live?”; and the “we” are the members 
of a particular, and inevitably local, community in which the asker finds 
herself or himself.19 Thus the values by which a political community is to 
live are necessarily local: they cannot but be the values that the members 
of that community understand as theirs. (Democratic communitarians 
will go further than this, to argue that the values by which a political 
community is to live ought to be determined by its members by a process of 
democratic deliberation.) There is thus no “view from nowhere” (Nagel 
1986), from which we can determine the values that should guide a polity; 
political deliberation must begin from, be grounded in, somewhere—some 
particular local community of thought. But two things, which worry 
Gargarella about my view, do not follow from this.
First, it does not follow that a community’s values cannot be criticized 
either by its members or by outsiders. Even if we can imagine a community 
whose modes of thought, whose normative and conceptual structures, are 
so monolithic, and so insulated from others, as to leave no room for internal 
dissent to even make sense, and no scope for external critique via shared 
concepts or values,20 the political communities that actually exist are not 
like that: there is conceptual room, even if in more totalitarian polities 
there is no normative welcome, for internal critiques; and there is room for 
critiques from outside appealing to values that are, if not currently 
espoused by the polity, at least accessible to it.
Second, it does not follow that a political community cannot espouse 
liberal values—or that critics cannot argue that it should do so: values such 
as individual autonomy or freedom, privacy, equality, “equal concern and 
respect” (Dworkin 1986: 190)—although those values would, on a 
communitarian account, be given a communitarian interpretation as 
values that structure our lives together. That is how I can be a liberal 
19  I say “inevitably local” for two reasons. First, the scope of any community is 
contingent, however large it might in fact be, whereas the “universalism” with which 
Gargarella is concerned is a priori, concerning all rational beings. Second, as a matter of 
fact, the political communities in which humans live are relatively local rather than global: 
whatever power there is to the idea of a cosmopolitan community of “humanity”, political 
communities as we have them are much more local.
20 Though even Oceania, in Orwell’s 1984, did not manage to achieve this.
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communitarian: I can hope to live in a polity structured by liberal values; 
as a member of this polity, I can argue that we ought to espouse liberal 
values; I can argue with members of other political communities, which do 
not espouse liberal values, that they ought to do so—not by appealing to 
some supposedly a priori universal values binding on all rational beings, 
but by appealing to the conceptual links that exist between their existing 
values and liberal values. Thus, to take one of Gargarella’s examples (2020: 
197-8), someone who mocks the traditions and way of life that Catalans 
regard as important to their identity as a political community, might be 
seen by Catalans as attacking their res publica. But, first, this is not 
necessary, since their conception of their res publica might include a 
commitment to robust political debate of which this kind of critique is a 
part. Second, even if it is an attack, they can be committed to a liberal value 
of freedom of speech, given which such attacks must be tolerated, if not 
welcomed—and we could argue, either as Catalans or as outsiders, that 
they ought to be thus committed.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can turn to Gargarella’s 
central concern: that my account cannot do suitably democratic justice to 
multiculturalism, or to the manifest fact that we do not live in normatively 
homogenous communities. The problem here might take two forms. First, 
we can imagine that several culturally and normatively distinct groups, or 
a large number of individuals with very different values, share a territory 
and have to work out how they can live together, given that they are roughly 
equal in power: the question then will be whether they can come to agree 
on enough in the way of values and procedures to make it possible to live 
together as a political community—as distinct from living beside each 
other in a state of uneasy co-existence. That is not, I think, the version that 
worries Gargarella—or the version that we typically find in our 
contemporary world. The more usual version is that an existing polity 
contains a dominant cultural group (dominant perhaps in numbers, 
certainly in power), and one or more weaker groups; or a dominant majority 
and a dissenting minority who do not share the majority’s core values. 
What is to be done in such situations?
A tempting way to approach this question is to ask what “we” should do 
about such non-powerful minority cultures, or such dissidents: what can 
“we” say to “them”; how far should “we” tolerate “their” different values 
and customs, or allow “them” to live by their distinctive values? But, as I 
think Gargarella and I agree, that is a dangerously misleading way to put 
the question: for it implies that those who must answer the question, the 
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“we”, are the members of the dominant majority; and that they, and only 
they, must decide what to do about or to or with these others. That is what 
all too often in fact happens: but if the question is what should happen in a 
polity that aspires to democracy, the “we” who decide what to do must 
include all those in the polity, in a democratic deliberation in which every 
voice can be heard, and is heard with attention and respect—in, as 
Gargarella puts it, “a public, collective conversation” (2020: 205). What 
form that conversation should take, how it should be institutionalized 
(since any large polity needs institutions to actualize its democratic 
aspirations), who is in the end to speak for “the polity”—these are familiar 
issues for democratic theory, on which I won’t take a view here.  But 
whatever form that conversation is to take, it must end with a decision (or, 
if no decision can be reached, with the collapse of the polity): one that we 
cannot realistically expect to be unanimous, even if we can hope for 
something close to unanimous agreement on the kind of procedure by 
which it is to be reached. We (the “we” who constitute the polity) must 
address and listen to each other respectfully: we must try to understand 
the values by which others want to live, which might require us to try to 
understand the distinctive way of life in which those values are embedded; 
we must see whether disagreements can be resolved through discussion, 
so that those who initially disagreed about how to live can come to agree; 
if we cannot agree on those substantive questions, we must try to agree on 
where differences should be accepted—you live your lives, we live ours 
(bearing in mind that the “you” and the “we” are still fellow members of a 
larger “we”). I think that Gargarella and I also agree on two further points.
First, we are not relativists who would say that each culture must be left 
free to determine its own way of life (see Gargarella 2020: 195):21 it must be 
open to “us” to come in the end to the view that a particular culture should 
not be allowed to continue with this or that culturally embedded practice 
(with a practice of “female genital mutilation”, for instance, or of “honour 
killings” of disobedient daughters),22  even if that is not a view that members 
of the particular culture can be persuaded to accept. Second, as should 
already be clear, we do not believe that the dominant group should claim 
the right simply to enact (to “impose”) its own values: even if they have the 
21 I am talking here of how “we” are to deal with multiculturalism: the issues raised 
by individual dissenters or rebels have the same form, and can be addressed in the same way 
(see further Duff 2018: chs 3.4, 5.7).
22 It is worth noting how disagreement about the permissibility of certain practices 
is also disagreement about how they should be described—hence the scare quotes in this 
bracket.
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effective power to do so, they must engage as citizens with all their fellows, 
seeking to build a “we” that includes everyone in the “public, collective 
conversation”.23
In the end, however, and assuming that quite often we will be unable to 
agree either on the substantive issue or on whether we should simply 
accept difference, there will need to be a decision procedure, from which 
will emerge (if the polity can survive at all) something that can count as 
the polity’s view, and therefore as “our” collective view; and there will then 
be people (officials of some kind) who are entitled to speak and act in the 
community’s name. If there is to be a criminal law (something that requires 
argument, but that Gargarella does not seem to deny), it will then define as 
public wrongs some kinds of conduct that some members of the polity will 
not see as wrongs. I offer no view here on what those should be, but again 
emphasize the importance of distinguishing the procedural from the 
substantive stages of the argument. We can argue first about the procedures 
through which a democratic polity should determine its laws; and we can 
argue secondly about what the substantive outcome of those procedures 
should be—for instance when we engage, as citizens, in the public 
conversation that will determine our laws: but we must recognize that the 
outcome of a democratically impeccable procedure might be one with 
which we substantively disagree—that is a familiar truth about democracy. 
All of which is to say that both Gargarella and I recognize the serious 
problems raised for would-be democrats by the facts of deep cultural 
differences and deep normative disagreements within contemporary 
polities; we agree that such problems must be addressed within the polities 
themselves, through a democratic deliberation in which every citizen has 
an equal voice; we recognize that such deliberations may result, not in 
unanimous agreement, but in a decision with which some will be unhappy; 
and we therefore realize that there can be no clean and simple route to a 
resolution of such disagreements—only the messy processes of democratic 
deliberation. 
 
23 There are then further familiar problems about the possibility of such conversation: 
suppose that one group refuses even to listen to the kinds of argument that another group 
offers (one aspect of the problem of “public reason”), or denies that certain kinds of people 
(identified by gender, or race, for instance) should have an equal voice, or any voice, in the 
conversation. Although the appeal to democratic conversation generates a largely procedural 
account, the procedure itself involves certain substantive pre-commitments about the 
standing of those who are to engage in it.
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6.  PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALIZATION
I must turn now to issues more directly concerned with criminalization. 
Tatjana Hörnle and I agree that we cannot expect to articulate a single 
thick master principle of criminalization—a principle providing 
determinate substantive criteria by which to decide what kinds of conduct 
we have good reason to criminalize: any such principle will either be too 
narrow, as failing to capture kinds of wrongful conduct that we clearly 
have reason to criminalize; or become so diluted, as it is revised or extended 
so as to capture every kind of criminalizable conduct, that it can no longer 
offer substantive guidance (Hörnle 2020; see Duff 2018: ch. 6). My response 
to this critique of “single principle” theories of criminalization is still to 
offer a single master principle, but one that is avowedly very thin: the 
“public wrongs” principle explained in s. 2 above. Hörnle’s response is 
different: she argues that we can still identify determinate, thick principles 
of criminalization; but that we need two (or even three) such principles, 
rather than just one, if we are to capture all the kinds of conduct that there 
is good reason to criminalize.
I discuss Hörnle’s proposed principles below, but should first make two 
brief comments on the relationship between her account and mine. First, 
her substantive principles could be seen as complementary to, rather than 
as competing with, the thin principle that I offer—as spelling out in more 
substantive terms the criteria by which we are to identify relevant public 
wrongs: a type of conduct constitutes a public wrong if it is incompatible 
with an important collective interest, or violates another’s right to non-
intervention. Second, a merit of the kind of thin principle that I offer is 
that, whilst it does not provide substantive guidance about what kinds of 
conduct we have reason to criminalize, it shows what kinds of argument 
are relevant for, or against, criminalization: thus whilst it might not directly 
address the “genuine puzzlement” of legislators or civil servants 
deliberating about criminalization (Hörnle 2020: 212), by offering them 
direct guidance on what they should or should not criminalize, it can help 
them to see what kinds of reason they need to consider, what kinds of 
argument they need to offer.
Now for Hörnle’s proposed principles. Two are responsive principles 
concerning conduct that violates others’ rights “to non-intervention”: we 
categorically must criminalize all violent attacks that violate “important 
rights of others”; and we have good reason to criminalize other kinds of 
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violations of the right to non-intervention.24 How thick are these principles; 
and how complete, as regards kinds of criminalizable conduct that do not 
violate collective interests? As Hörnle points out, if our topic is criminal 
law, we must be concerned with rights as they figure in our relations to 
each other not simply as moral agents, but as citizens: with, I would say, 
rights as they figure within, or bear on, the civil order in which we live as 
citizens.25 As she also points out, there is no serious dispute about the 
criminalizability of the most obvious kinds of right-violation in this 
context, such as murder, rape, and other kinds of violent attack on the 
person (although there is room for argument about just how we should 
define these as crimes). She also argues that we can distinguish a “core” 
set of rights-violations that we must criminalize from other kinds of 
violation that we have only pro tanto reason to criminalize, and that I do 
not do justice to that core set, since I say only that we must criminalize 
them if we have a system of criminal law—whereas she argues that we have 
“a categorical duty to create criminal law in the core area” (2020: 216; see 
Duff 2018: 277). This is not a significant disagreement, since I explain later 
(2018: 299-301) why such wrongs must count as serious public wrongs, 
which we have very good reason to criminalize. I do not, it is true, insist 
with Hörnle that we must create criminal law in order to criminalize them: 
for I would not rule out a priori the possibility that a polity could find 
suitable ways to mark and respond to such wrongs that might not count as 
“criminal law”; but I agree that they violate values that must be central to 
any plausible polity’s conception of its civil order, and are inconsistent 
with the most basic requirements of civil order. However, first, to see why 
these are such obviously, indisputably, central kinds of public wrong, we 
need to appeal to a conception of a polity—of, as I would put it, civil order; 
or, as Hörnle puts it, of what it is to be a citizen living with other citizens. 
Second, how are we to distinguish “core” rights-violations, which must be 
24 Hörnle seems to think (2020: 216) that I would deny such essentially responsive 
principles, since I think that the criminal law is “essentially preventive”, but my view is the 
reverse of this. In the passage from which she quotes (Duff 2018: 261), I begin by noting that 
on my account criminal law is “essentially responsive”, but then add that it is “also essentially 
preventive, or perhaps … persuasive”. Thus I agree that in the case of violent rights-violations 
the primary reason to criminalize is responsive; I differ from her, as we will see, in that I 
would say the same about our reasons to criminalize conduct that violates important 
collective interests.
25 Another point of clarification. Hörnle argues, criticising my account, that “[c]
rimes against persons are not foremost conduct that violates the civil order. They are this, 
too, but this is not the most salient description. The main feature is interpersonal” (2020: 
214). I agree: the wrong that we have reason to criminalize, what I call the object of 
criminalization, consists precisely in the violation of another’s rights; that it violates the 
civil order is relevant purely as a condition of criminalization, as making that wrong the 
collective business of the polity and its citizens (see Duff 2018: 216-7).
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criminalized, from other kinds of violation of the right to non-intervention? 
Hörnle specifies  “individuals’ most important rights (rights to life, bodily 
integrity, sexual autonomy, freedom of movement, freedom from 
coercion)”, violent attacks on which will then form the core of criminal law 
(2020: 215):26  but it is not clear, at least to me, why only violent attacks 
should count; or whether every kind of violent attack (including for instance 
minor physical assaults) must count; or why only these rights, and the 
interests that they protect, should be included. More significantly, it is not 
clear why we should try to draw a sharp distinction between the core and 
the non-core—rather than saying, more plausibly, that we can distinguish 
along a spectrum (or two spectra) more from less important rights, and 
more from less significant kinds of violation of them; and that the more 
important the right, and the more significant the violation, the stronger 
our reason to criminalize it.
If we abandon, as I suggest we should, Hörnle’s sharp distinction 
between core and non-core, we are left with just one principle in place of 
her latter two: that the “state has reason to criminalize conduct if it violates 
another person’s right to non-intervention”.27 But how thick or substantive 
is this principle? We need, of course, an account of what kinds of conduct 
are to count as “intervention”, and of what kinds of intervention violate 
rights. I cannot pursue this in detail here, but would suggest, first, that any 
account of “wrongful intervention” must appeal to a conception of civil 
order, since only on that basis can we give an account either of what counts 
as intervention (since intervention must be into a sphere one can count as 
one’s own), or of which kinds of intervention are wrongful: but in that case, 
in giving an account of rights to non-intervention we are already giving an 
account of public wrongs, and the notion of “rights to non-intervention” 
proves to be hardly thicker than that of “public wrongs”, save that it focuses 
our attention on wrongs with individual victims. For we are giving an 
account of the kinds of conduct that we are entitled to expect or demand of 
each other, as citizens—or of the kinds of conduct about which we are 
entitled, as citizens, to complain: whether we call such complaint-
grounding conduct victimizing public wrongs, or rights-violations, we are 
in effect saying the same thing. Thus to ask whether, for instance, we have 
reason to criminalize conduct that violates dignity would be, on Hörnle’s 
account, to ask whether citizens have a right not to be treated with 
indignity—whether this constitutes a wrongful intervention. On my 
26 Though she should presumably, given what she and I agree on (see above), talk of 
the most important rights of individuals as citizens.
27 2020: 220. She adds “(however, there might be countervailing reasons)”, but that 
seems unnecessary: if a principle says only that we have reason to criminalize, that leaves 
open the possibility that there might be other, countervailing reasons in.
262 R. A. Duff 
LEAP 7 (2019)
account, it is to ask whether our civil order should be defined, in part, in 
terms of respect for dignity: these seem to me to be in effect the same 
question, in which case Hörnle’s rights-violation principle is hardly thicker 
than my “public wrong” principle.
Second, we must also ask whether all victimizing crimes could be 
portrayed as violating a right to non-intervention—without depriving that 
right of any substantive content. Familiar examples will surface here: 
crimes of omission—of failing to help someone in desperate need (can 
such failures be portrayed as wrongful interventions?); or crimes 
committed against the dead such as corpse desecration (see Jones 2017); or 
crimes against non-human animals.28 The key question is again whether 
these are wrongs that should concern us as citizens, in virtue of their 
incompatibility with some value internal to our civil order; I do not see that 
it helps much to translate that question into one about rights.
I turn now to Hörnle’s other principle, concerning the protection of 
collective interests, and begin with a clarification. Hörnle insists that this 
principle, unlike those which deal with rights-violations, is “straightforwardly 
preventive” (2020: 213), but she conflates two different types of (apparently) 
preventive principle. One is indeed “straightforwardly preventive”: “We 
have reason to prohibit X if this will prevent harm”.29  The other, by contrast, 
looks initially responsive: “The state has reason to criminalize conduct if it 
is incompatible with important collective interests”—though it adds “that 
cannot be adequately protected by other means” (2020: 219-20). The former 
principle is purely preventive and forward-looking: we are to ask simply 
whether prohibiting this type of conduct will prevent harm to collective 
interests; and although the obvious way to prevent such harm is to prohibit 
conduct that is likely to cause such harm, we might sometimes secure 
preventive benefits by introducing regulations that also prohibit conduct 
that is neither harmful nor dangerous. The latter principle, by contrast, is 
responsive, since it requires criminal sanctions to be a response to conduct 
that itself violates or threatens a collective interest, even if the purpose of 
that response is (in part) to prevent future harms. The difference between 
these two types of principle can be illustrated by driving offences. If we 
criminalize dangerous driving or driving when rendered unfit through 
drink or drugs,30  we criminalize conduct that is itself incompatible with 
important collective interests—and is for that reason wrongful. If instead 
28 See e.g. (Animal Welfare Act 2006). Hörnle notes the possibility of appeals to 
animal rights (2020: 213, n. 5); but it seems to me unnecessary to go down that road.
29 Hörnle 2020: 213. She cites Duff 2018: 238, where I talk of having reason to 
criminalize a type of conduct if by doing so we will prevent harm; as we will see, the 
replacement of “criminalize” by “prohibit” matters.
30 See e.g. Road Traffic Act 1988, ss 2, 4.
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we prohibit driving at more than a specified speed, or with more than a 
specific proportion of alcohol in one’s blood,31 we are likely to prevent harm 
more efficiently, but we do this by including within the prohibition conduct 
that is not itself harmful or dangerous, since not all of those who break the 
speed limit, or drive with a higher than permitted level of alcohol, will be 
driving dangerously or be impaired. Such prohibitions are not yet criminal 
laws, since they do not mark the prohibited conduct as being wrongful (as 
criminal laws mark the conduct they define as criminal); the criminal law 
comes into the picture only when we criminalize, as wrongful, breaches of 
these kinds of regulation.32 
Of these principles (“We have reason to prohibit X if this will prevent 
harm”, “The state has reason to criminalize conduct if it is incompatible 
with important collective interests”), the latter is indeed a principle of 
criminalization, so long as we can say that conduct that is incompatible 
with important collective interests is for that reason wrongful: for if it is 
thus wrongful, it constitutes a public wrong in a very straightforward way, 
as impinging directly on a public interest. But our reason to criminalize is 
then, as in the case of rights-violations, as much responsive as preventive, 
since in both cases the publicly wrongful character of the conduct gives us 
reason (makes it appropriate) to respond to it by calling the wrongdoer to 
formal public account through a criminal process. In both cases, we also 
have a preventive interest; but what is intrinsic to criminalization is the 
responsive dimension. What is true is, admittedly, that when it comes to 
the question of whether we should criminalize all things considered (as 
distinct from the initial question of whether we have reason to criminalize 
at all), the balance between responsive and preventive considerations 
might differ as between different kinds of wrong. Perhaps responsive 
considerations will weigh more heavily in the case of serious wrongs, 
whilst preventive considerations will be more prominent with less serious 
wrongs: we might see strong or even compelling reasons to criminalize 
very serious wrongs, even if by doing so we do not expect to achieve much 
in the way of prevention;33  whereas with (relatively) minor wrongs we 
might think that we should criminalize (rather than responding in some 
other way) only if this would be preventively efficient. Even so, this does 
31 See Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, ss 81-9; Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 5.
32 On these two kinds of principle, and the distinction (important to understanding 
the character of so-called “mala prohibita”) between criminalization and regulation, see 
Duff 2018: 21, 65-8, 237-48. Another issue (Duff 2018: 16-19, 284-6) is whether we should 
maintain a (formally) non-criminal system of regulations whose violations do not (formally) 
count as criminal, like the German system of Ordnungswidrigkeiten.
33 Even if we expect no preventive effect? As Hörnle notes (2020: 216) it is hard to 
imagine such a case; and if criminal law as a whole has some preventive efficacy (and this is 
necessary to its justification), consistency requires us to criminalize serious public wrongs 
even if in particular cases this is not preventively effective.
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not support Hörnle’s claim that the principle concerning conduct that 
violates collective interests is a preventive principle, whereas that 
concerning conduct that violates others’ rights is responsive (Hörnle 2020: 
213-216). It would support her claim if violations of individual rights were 
always more serious than violations of collective interests, but that is surely 
not true: compare treason, or large scale tax evasion or fraud against the 
public purse, with damaging another’s property or a minor physical 
assault.
We must also ask of Hörnle’s “collective interests” principle, as of her 
“rights-violations” principle, how thick it is; and the answer is again that it 
is almost as thin as my public wrongs principle. For we must first identify 
the collective interests of the members of the polity (and assess how 
important each is): which we can do only by getting clear about the 
character of the polity, and the interests that its members share in virtue of 
their membership—about, that is, the polity’s civil order. Hörnle is scathing 
about the German Rechtsgutslehre, according to which we have good 
reason to criminalize conduct that violates or threatens a “Rechtsgut”, a 
legally protected good: the concept of a Rechtsgut is, she says, “not only a 
thin concept, but so thin as to be an empty concept” (2020: 212). Now I 
would not myself call it “empty”, since there will be constraints at least of 
intelligibility on what one could count as a good worthy of recognition or 
protection by the law; but if it is empty, so too is that of a collective interest, 
since to work out the interests of either an individual or a group, we must 
first have some idea of the good of that individual or group. We can try to 
distinguish criminal laws that protect, or respond to violations of, 
individual interests or rights from those that protect, or respond to 
violations of, collective interests,34  and in  both contexts there will be 
plenty of obvious cases of conduct that we of course have reason to 
criminalize (because, I would say, in such cases it is obvious that any 
plausible polity must count them as public wrongs): but when the cases 
become controversial or unclear rather than easy, I do not think that 
Hörnle offers a principle that is both thick and plausible in either the 
individual or the collective context can.
7.  A RIGHT TO BE PROSECUTED—AND A DUTY TO FACE 
TRIAL?
Finally, I turn to Gustavo Beade’s interesting discussion of “the right to be 
prosecuted” (Beade 2020). Beade’s leading example is Mr Lamb, who 
makes some (to put it mildly) intemperate remarks at a promotional event, 
34 Though this will sometimes involve controversy, for instance about the normative 
grounding of property crimes (on which see Simester and Sullivan 2005).
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about the legal age of sexual consent, about rape, and generally about law. 
Given their context and their topic, his remarks are clearly a public matter: 
they are, it seems, intended as public contributions to public debate about 
matters of public concern. Beade also takes it that they clearly constitute a 
public wrong, as an instance of “incitement to hatred”, of a kind that we 
therefore have reason to criminalize (2020: 232): but that is a bit quick. To 
argue, as Mr Lamb does, that the legal age of sexual consent (which we 
must suppose is specified in his polity as something over sixteen) is “an 
atrocity” does not look like incitement to crime, especially since he talks 
only of consensual intercourse in that context: it is an overdramatically 
rhetorical way of arguing that the law ought to be changed. His remarks 
about women who “need to be raped”, and about the “rights of women” are 
more clearly wrong, as expressing unacceptable moral views: they might 
or might not constitute an offence of “incitement” in English or American 
law, for instance (we would need to inquire more closely both into his 
intentions and into the likely effects of his words) but they might amount 
to an offence in German law (to which Beade appeals), as “assault[ing] the 
human dignity of others”.35  Let us agree, however, that we can frame the 
example so that Mr Lamb’s remarks clearly constitute a public wrong: they 
are, that is, wrongful in a way that properly concerns his fellow citizens, in 
virtue of their impact on or their implications for the polity’s civil order.
If remarks of this kind constitute a public wrong, we therefore have on 
my account good reason to criminalise them. However, this is not yet to say 
that they should be criminalized, all things considered: for although we 
have reason to criminalize them, we must ask whether we should 
criminalize them rather than responding in one of the various other ways 
that are available to us, including doing nothing formal or legal, and relying 
solely on informal kinds of social response to do justice to the wrong (see 
Duff 2018: ch. 7.2). I won’t discuss most of the other possibilities here,36  but 
should say something about the significance of the kinds of informal social 
response that Mr Lamb suffered—or more precisely, since we are talking 
so far about whether to criminalize this kind of conduct, rather than about 
whether to prosecute Mr Lamb in particular, about the kinds of informal 
response that those who commit this kind of wrong are likely to suffer. The 
central question is this: should we see such responses as informal, not 
centrally organized, versions of the kind of response that is formally, 
publicly, provided by a criminal prosecution; or as something quite 
different? If the former, we must ask whether we should criminalize as 
35 See German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) § 130(1).1; Beade 2020: 232, n. 14; for 
English and American law, see Ormerod and Laird 2018: 474-94; LaFave 2017: ch. 11.1.
36 But see in particular Beade’s comments on why a “restorative justice” response 
might not be appropriate (Beade 2020: 229-30).
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something additional to such informal responses (for instance because 
they are thought not to be adequate); or as a formal replacement for such 
responses, perhaps because they are liable to be misdirected or excessive. 
If the latter, then it is not clear why the likelihood of such informal responses 
should be relevant to the question of criminalization.
I am not quite sure how Beade would answer these questions. He talks 
of the informal responses as species of “public blame”, which itself is “the 
foundation on which a certain type of retributive-communicative 
punishment is based” (Beade 2020: 224): this implies that a criminal 
prosecution would provide a formal, perhaps more serious or more 
proportionate, version of roughly the same kind of censorial response. On 
the other hand, he also talks of “public humiliation”, and of “‘lynching’ in 
the mass media” (2020: 224), which seem rather different. I would myself 
say that blame (blaming another to his face) is a mode of calling to account: 
that is how it can provide the basis for “retributive-communicative 
punishment”, and for criminal prosecution as a formal mode of calling to 
public account; and such a calling to account is an appropriate response to 
the wrongdoing of others whom we are still to see and address as responsible 
fellow members of our normative community (of, in this case, the polity). 
But public humiliation and media “lynching” are not modes of calling to 
account; they are therefore not species of public blame (at least of the kind 
that criminal prosecution formalizes, or of the kind that is appropriate 
between citizens).
However, whatever we should say about public humiliation or media 
lynching, there are clearly informal modes of calling to censorial public 
account that wrongdoers like Mr Lamb might face; these are indeed a 
feature of a number of recent social and political campaigns, part of whose 
aim is to “call out”, or to call to properly public account, those who commit 
various kinds of wrong that have not hitherto been taken seriously enough. 
The question of criminalization is then in part the question of whether 
such informal callings to account can be expected to be adequately reliable 
and proportionate; if they cannot, that gives us good (which is not yet to 
say conclusive) reason to criminalize—both to ensure that an appropriate 
response is available and, perhaps, to pre-empt the possibility of 
dangerously disorganized and excessive informal responses.37 
If we turn now from the question of whether we should criminalize 
conduct of the type in which Mr Lamb engages, to the question of whether 
he should be prosecuted, similar issues will arise. In England, for instance, 
the prosecutor would need to decide not only whether she could lead 
37 Compare the idea that a system of formal criminal punishment can serve, in part, 
to pre-empt vigilante attempts at retribution or revenge: see e.g. Gardner 1998.
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evidence at his trial that would give a reasonable prospect of conviction, 
but also whether it would be “in the public interest” to prosecute him; even 
in jurisdictions in which prosecutors are supposedly bound by a “legality 
principle” that requires them to prosecute if there is sufficient evidence of 
the person’s guilt, they actually have a considerable degree of discretion as 
to whether to prosecute (or investigate) in individual cases. 38 I think Beade 
and I roughly agree on the kinds of consideration to which prosecutors 
should attend (and to which legislators should attend in deciding whether 
to criminalize such conduct in the first place): the importance of calling to 
formal public account those who commit public wrongs—which requires 
that the calling be done by some person or body who can properly claim to 
speak for the polity (something that the often self-appointed leaders of 
informal responses might claim, but not with reliable authority); and how 
and why this is owed to the wrongdoer as well as to the victim(s). As Beade 
rightly emphasizes, it follows that wrongdoers have a categorical but non-
absolute right to be prosecuted: that is, not only a right to be prosecuted 
rather than being subjected to other kinds of legal coercion that may fail to 
treat them as responsible agents, but a right to be prosecuted rather than 
having their wrongdoing ignored. To put the point simply, if we are to treat 
each other as responsible fellow members of a normative community (of, 
in this case, a polity), we must be ready and willing to, inter alia, call each 
other to account for the wrongs that we commit against each other.
I want to focus here, however, on a question that Beade addresses only 
briefly: does the offender also have an “obligation”, as Beade puts it, to 
explain himself—to answer for his conduct, or to provide an account of 
that conduct. Beade is sure that we should not assert any such obligation: 
“[w]e cannot claim that a polity may demand an explanation, nor therefore 
maintain that the wrongdoer is under an obligation to explain himself” 
(Beade 2020: 228). But this is, I think, much too quick.
If we focus first, as Beade appears to focus, on whether defendants 
should have a legal obligation to account for themselves, we need to be 
clear that to impose a legal obligation is not to “force” the person to answer 
(Beade 2020: 228)—unless the sanction for not answering is really drastic;39 
even if a failure to discharge such an obligation rendered the person liable 
not merely to formal censure, but to punishment, that need not amount to 
forcing them. We should also distinguish different obligations that might 
38 On the two tests that English prosecutors must apply, see Ashworth and Redmayne 
2010: 194-214; on the legality principle and its actual operation, see e.g. Perrodet 2002, Boyne 
2017; see further Duff 2018: 45-9.
39 Defendants in English trials used to be forced to enter a plea, since anyone who 
refused to do so was subjected to the “peine forte et dure” to coerce a plea (see McKenzie 
2005); but a legal obligation need not be thus coercive.
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figure here: for instance, an obligation to appear for trial when summoned; 
an obligation to enter a formal plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” (and, 
separately, an obligation to plead honestly); and an obligation not merely 
to answer formally to the charge by entering a plea, but to engage in the 
trial and to answer or account for one’s conduct.40  Thus in English law, for 
instance, defendants do have a legal obligation to appear for trial, and can 
be arrested and brought (forcibly) to court if they fail to do so;41  they are 
asked, but are not legally required, to enter a plea (if a defendant refuses to 
plead, a plea of “Not Guilty” is entered on his or her behalf); and they are 
not legally required to play any part in the trial, or to offer any account of 
their actions—though exercising such a right of silence might of course 
have consequences, if it involves failing to alert the court to a possible 
defence. Now I do not myself find the first of these legal obligations, to 
appear for trial, normatively worrying (assuming, of course, a tolerably 
just criminal process as part of a tolerably just system of criminal law, and 
a non-oppressive police force), but I do agree with Beade that defendants 
should not be legally obligated either to enter a plea or to answer for their 
conduct, on pain of further sanctions if they refuse to do so—essentially 
for the reason that he gives, that if defendants are to be treated as 
responsible agents, they must retain the legal right to refuse to answer to 
the charge, and to refuse to account for themselves. A rebel or dissident 
who rejects the authority of the court, and who regards his trial as an 
oppressive travesty, will not be able to avoid being tried (the law cannot 
allow dissent to bar the trial): but he should be allowed, without further 
penal consequences, to make clear his denial of the court’s authority by 
refusing to play any active part in the process.
However, it does not follow from this that the polity may not “demand 
an explanation”; nor that we cannot say that a defendant has a civic, as 
opposed to a legal, responsibility or obligation to enter a plea and to answer 
for his conduct in the trial. Civic obligations lack the formal force of law: 
they are nothing more (or less) than aspects of what we hope is a shared 
understanding of what it is to be a citizen, of what we owe to each other as 
citizens; they are enforceable only by informal persuasion from our fellow 
citizens; but they are crucial aspects of civic life—there would be something 
sadly amiss with a polity whose members recognized only legal obligations 
or responsibilities towards each other. If we are to ask whether those who 
have committed criminal wrongs, or those who are accused on reasonable 
grounds of committing such wrongs, have a civic obligation or responsibility 
40 My comments here apply to “adversarial” trials; the account would need to be 
adjusted for trials in more “inquisitorial” systems.
41 At least for trials “on indictment”, for more serious offences; see Bail Act 1976, s. 7.
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to answer such accusations, and to answer for their conduct, in a criminal 
trial, the answer must surely be that they do—assuming, again, a tolerably 
just system of criminal justice, which addresses them properly as members 
of the polity.
The justification for this answer is that if I am a citizen of the polity 
whose criminal law I am accused of violating, I have a civic responsibility 
to assist the criminal law’s enterprise, including the enterprise of calling 
criminal wrongdoers to public account: if I know that I am a criminal 
wrongdoer, I must recognize my crime as a public wrong, for which I should 
now answer, to my fellow citizens, whose business it is; and the criminal 
trial is the public forum in which criminal wrongdoers are formally called 
to answer. I must therefore be ready to face trial—and indeed, if I know 
that I am guilty, to plead guilty at my trial.  Even if I believe (or know) that 
I am innocent, I have a responsibility to answer to the accusation, to 
explain why I am not guilty—and to offer evidence to back that explanation 
up: for I must recognise that the enterprise of calling public wrongdoers to 
censorial account requires a practice of calling alleged public wrongdoers 
to account, in order to establish whether they are guilty or not; and as a 
citizen whose law this is, I have a responsibility to assist in that enterprise, 
and to answer to my fellow citizens if I am accused (on reasonable grounds) 
of committing a public wrong. This is one of the ways in which citizens of a 
democratic republic should see themselves not merely as subject to its law, 
but as agents of the law—as active participants in the enterprise of 
democratic self-governance. 
However, I should emphasize that this civic responsibility to participate 
in my criminal trial ought not (for the reasons indicated above) be turned 
into a sanction-backed legal duty; a citizen must retain the legal right to 
refuse to take part in the process. I should also emphasize that citizens can 
have such a civic responsibility only in a polity and a criminal justice 
system that is tolerably just: one that treats them as equal members of the 
political community, with the respect and concern that is therefore due to 
them; one that imposes humane, proportionate punishments on convicted 
offenders; and one whose criminal process enables those accused of 
crimes to answer for themselves as responsible citizens.  I leave it to readers 
to ask how far our existing systems of criminal law meet these conditions.
8.  CONCLUDING REMARK
I am painfully aware of at least some of the flaws in my book: in particular 
of the number of questions that it leaves unanswered, of various ways in 
which its arguments are under-developed or unclear, of how much work 
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remains to be done to articulate more adequately and persuasively a 
normative understanding of criminal law as helping to sustain and to 
constitute a polity’s civil order, by providing an appropriate response to 
wrongs that violate that order. My commentators here have highlighted 
some of those flaws: but I hope that in my response I have shown that they 
have not cast doubt on the central features of this account of criminal law.
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